27-07-2025
Hun Sen or Hun Manet: Thailand holds all the cards against the duo — Phar Kim Beng
JULY 27 — The border crisis between Thailand and Cambodia has laid bare the illusory nature of Cambodia's political transition.
Far from fading into the background, Hun Sen has reclaimed the national stage, steering Phnom Penh's response with an iron grip.
Rather than acting as an elder advisor, Hun Sen is the central figure directing Cambodia's strategy, eclipsing his son, Prime Minister Hun Manet, in both authority and visibility.
Publicly accusing Thailand of provocations, Hun Sen has reasserted himself as Cambodia's top decision-maker, revealing that the much-touted generational shift was largely cosmetic.
While Cambodia's statecraft remains highly personalized and centralized, Thailand presents a stark contrast: an institutionalized system capable of calibrating its response across multiple layers of governance. In this unfolding conflict, Thailand holds the advantage—not just militarily, but diplomatically and economically as well.
Thailand's military capabilities significantly outpace those of Cambodia. With better-trained forces, advanced weaponry, air dominance, and superior logistics, Thailand maintains the upper hand in any potential escalation.
Cambodia's border units may be fierce and motivated, but they are no match for Thailand's coordinated defense infrastructure.
Beyond the battlefield, Thailand commands a stronger position in international diplomacy. As a long-standing and respected member of ASEAN, Thailand enjoys credibility in regional and global forums.
In contrast, Cambodia is increasingly viewed as dependent on external patrons, especially China, and as a country whose governance is undermined by opaque leadership and economic entanglement with illicit digital operations.
Even Beijing, while publicly urging restraint, may prefer Bangkok's institutional stability over Hun Sen's unpredictable behavior.
The economic disparity between the two nations further tilts the scales. Thailand's economy is more diversified, more resilient, and more integrated into regional supply chains. It possesses the capacity to weather shocks, both diplomatic and financial.
Cambodia's economy, by comparison, remains fragile and vulnerable, heavily reliant on tourism, garment exports, and, increasingly, dark digital scams proliferating along the border with Thailand.
These scam syndicates not only distort Cambodia's economic reputation but also entrench illicit networks that feed insecurity, corruption, and cross-border tensions.
Thailand's strength lies not just in its capabilities, but in its restraint. Even when faced with armed resistance, Bangkok relies on institutional decision-making through its foreign ministry, defense establishment, and national security apparatus.
This allows it to manage crises with measured responses, maintaining credibility while avoiding unnecessary escalation. Cambodia, on the other hand, suffers from a lack of diplomatic coherence, especially with the unclear balance of power between Hun Sen and Hun Manet.
This ambiguity in leadership is a critical weakness. Hun Manet may hold the title of Prime Minister, but he has not been allowed to lead with full authority.
Hun Sen's public resurgence in the current crisis diminishes his son's standing both domestically and internationally.
For Thailand and other regional actors, it is unclear beyond Hun Sen, who else to engage—raising doubts about a quick and swift end to the war let alone be able to have a ceasefire with Cambodia that can hold.
As and when Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim brokered a cease between the two countries on July 25 2025, it broke down in less than an hour after 12 PM.
This suggested the lack of any stability and direction in Cambodia since it was Hun Manet who made the announcement that a ceasefire had been established only to witness its own sudden end.
The result is a Cambodia that appears more divided and volatile, while Thailand can act with strategic patience. Bangkok does not need to force a quick resolution.
Time, regional sentiment, and diplomatic momentum are already on its side. Thailand's decision-makers understand that sustainable advantage lies not in immediate confrontation, but in leveraging regional mechanisms and narratives that position Bangkok as the more responsible actor.
Hun Sen's return may project strength in the short term, but it undermines the credibility of Cambodia's political evolution. Ironically this is why Thailand cannot attack Cambodia with total vehemence since Bangkok risks creating a serious power vacuum in Phnom Penh.
By denying his son the space to lead, Hun Sen, who is the President of the Cambodian Senate, signals to ASEAN and the broader international community that real change has not taken root.
This perception, once formed, is difficult to undo. Hun Manet's authority as the real Prime Minister has diminished totally despite being an alumni and a four star general once trained by West Point Military Academy of the US.
Ultimately, Thailand holds the cards because it plays the long game to erode Hun Sen first while hoping that Hun Manet can step into the shows of the father in future.
With stronger institutions, a credible military, and more trust from regional actors, Thailand does not need to provoke Cambodia.
It merely needs to weaken it from laying mines along the 817 KM borders which they share and preventing Hun Sen from resorting to any long range artilerries to bomb Bangkok.
Unfortunately, Hun Sen has made the thread before. Although he is equally aware that this must be the red line that Cambodia must not cross. If it does, the dynasty of Hun Sen risks being obliterated.
As things stand, Thailand simply needs to remain composed, knowing that Cambodia's volatility only strengthens Bangkok's position.
In this border crisis, it is not a contest between Hun Sen and Hun Manet—it is a contest between centralized personalism and institutional maturity. And on all fronts, Thailand prevails.
** Phar Kim Beng, PhD, is Professor of ASEAN Studies at the International Islamic University of Malaysia (IIUM) and the Director of the Institute of Internationalization and ASEAN Studies (IINTAS).
** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.
